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BIANNUAL SURVEY
by an attorney may only be subject to disclosure where special
circumstances exist. Since there would be no constitutional pro-
hibition against affording an attorney's work product the qualified,
as opposed to the absolute privilege, there should be no objection
to resolving the close cases in favor of allowing the court the
broadest possible discretion.
CPLR 3101(d) affords a privilege to any "material prepared
for litigation" 196 thus allowing a broad spectrum for judicial inter-
pretation. The Revisers concluded that "whether an internal
business report . . . is designed for use in litigation . . . may
be a close question best left to the courts." 197 It would appear
appropriate for the courts to decide each issue on an ad hoc basis
due to the infinite purposes for which such reports may be
used.
An amendment to CPLR 3101 seems desirable. Elimination
of the absolute privilege of 3101(c) and inclusion of the attorney's
work product under the qualified privilege of 3101(d) would more
accurately adhere to the Hickman doctrine, and correspondingly,
would eliminate the problem of determining whether a particular
item is an attorney's work product. The only question would
then be whether the material was primarily for use in litigation,
and if so, whether special circumstances existed. This would allow
judicial discretion in accord with the liberal philosophy of disclosure
and yet retain ample protection under CPLR 3101.'19
CPLR 3117(a)(1): Prior deposition of party not admissible to
contradict his own testimony.
CPLR 3117(a) (1) provides that "any deposition may be used
by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the
testimony of the deponent as a witness. ... 19 The query is
196 It should be noted that the word "material" contemplates not only
writings, but photographs as well. This is illustrated by the recent case of
Murdick v. Bush, 44 Misc. 2d 527, 254 N.Y.S.2d 54 (Sup. Ct. 1964), where
the court decided that photographs of the scene of an accident taken on the
day of the accident were subject to disclosure. Since the photographs merely
showed the scene as it existed, they were not the product of an attorney's
mind and hence, were not privileged under CPLR 3101(c). However, the
photographs were "material prepared for litigation" under 3101(d). Thus, they
became the proper subject for disclosure since a special circumstance was
shown.
The federal courts are in accord with this position. Nickels v. United
States, 25 F.R.D. 210 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
'19 FIRST REP. 120.
198 "The court may at any time . . . make a protective order denying
the use of any disclosure device." CPLR 3103(a). For a recent case in
accord with the position taken by The Biannual Survey see Montgomery
Ward Co. v. City of Lockport 44 Misc. 2d 923, 255 N.Y.S.2d 433 (Sup.
Ct. 1964).
199This section should be read in conjunction with CPLR 4514.
(Emphasis added.)
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whether the term, any party, is broad enough to allow a defendant
to use his prior deposition to contradict his present testimony, i.e.,
can a prior deposition be used as evidence in chief.
In Mravlja v. Hoke,20O the court held that it was error to
permit the defendant to contradict his own testimony by his prior
deposition. However, since the defendant had corrected his testi-
mony to conform to the deposition the error was not prejudicial.
Thus the term, any party, was held not broad enough to allow
a party to contradict his own testimony by his deposition.
Under the CPA, prior contradictory statements did not con-
stitute affirmative evidence; they were not admissible as evidence
in chief.201 The sole ground upon which such deposition was
admissible was to impeach the testimony of the deponent. This
philosophy has been incorporated into CPLR 3117(a) (1).202 Thus
a party cannot, under the CPLR, use a deposition to "impeach"
himself.
CPLR 3120: Examination before trial held prerequisite to
obtaining discovery.
Under CPA § 324, where discovery could only be had upon
a court order,08 it was generally held that an examination before
trial was a prerequisite to discovery.20 ' Then, if the inspection
permitted during the examination was inadequate, discovery would
be allowed.
In disallowing discovery, the court in Ossandon v. New York
City Transit Authority,20 5 cited Battaglia v. New York City Transit
Authority,2 8 a case decided under the CPA. "[I]t was not proper
to direct a discovery and inspection . . . before the conclusion
of the examination before trial. .... ,, 20 The court thus adhered
to the doctrine established under the CPA.
The CPLR has changed the law. Discovery may now be
had without motion, on notice alone. CPLR 3120 requires, how-
ever, that the objects of discovery be "specified with reasonable
particularity in the notice. .... ,, 208
When the party seeking discovery under CPLR 3120 has
not sufficient information to particularly specify the object of dis-
200 22 App. Div. 2d 848, 254 N.Y.S.2d 162 (3d Dep't 1964).
201 Roge v. Valentine, 280 N.Y. 268, 276, 20 N.E.2d 751, 754 (1939);
ef. Rosati v. H.W.E. Inc., 81 N.Y.S.2d at 412 (Sup. Ct. 1948).202 See FINAL REP. 450.
208 See, e.g., Gross v. Price, 2 App. Div. 2d 707, 153 N.Y.S.2d 424 (2d
Dep't 1956).
204 See, e.g., City Messenger Serv., Inc. v. Powers Photoengraving Co.,
7 App. Div. 2d 213, 181 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1st Dep't 1959).
205 44 Misc. 2d 256, 253 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct 1964).
206 2 App. Div. 2d 985, 157 N.Y.S.2d 797 (2d Dep't 1956).207 Id. at 986, 157 N.Y.S2d at 799.
208 CPLR 3120; see SLr'H REP. 321.
[ VoL., 39
